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This paper makes a case for examining energy transition as a geographical process, involving the
reconﬁguration of current patterns and scales of economic and social activity. The paper draws on a
seminar series on the ‘Geographies of Energy Transition: security, climate, governance’ hosted by the
authors between 2009 and 2011, which initiated a dialogue between energy studies and the discipline
of human geography. Focussing on the UK Government’s policy for a low carbon transition, the paper
provides a conceptual language with which to describe and assess the geographical implications of a
transition towards low carbon energy. Six concepts are introduced and explained: location, landscape,
territoriality, spatial differentiation, scaling, and spatial embeddedness. Examples illustrate how the
geographies of a future low-carbon economy are not yet determined and that a range of divergent – and
contending – potential geographical futures are in play. More attention to the spaces and places
that transition to a low-carbon economy will produce can help better understand what living in a
low-carbon economy will be like. It also provides a way to help evaluate the choices and pathways available.
& 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license. 1. Introduction
The ways in which societies secure energy and transform it to
do useful work exert a powerful inﬂuence on their economic
prosperity, geographical structure and international relations.
Major shifts in the role of different fuels and energy conversion
technologies in the global energy mix have often underpinned
broad social and geographical change, such as those accompany-
ing the transition from wood and water power to coal in the 19th
century, or from coal to oil in the twentieth (Jiusto, 2009, Smil,
2010). The energy challenge in the twenty-ﬁrst century is to bring
about a new transition, towards a more sustainable energy
system characterised by universal access to energy services, and
security and reliability of supply from efﬁcient, low-carbon
sources.. Bridge).
Y license.Ensuring the availability and accessibility of energy services
in a carbon-constrained world will require developing new
ways – and new geographies – of producing, living, and working
with energy. However, the geographical implications of this ‘new
energy paradigm’ are not well deﬁned, and a range of quite
different geographical futures are currently possible. For example,
low-carbon electricity generation can be achieved by large,
remote actors (nuclear, offshore wind or large-scale solar) and
long-distance transmission, via local mini-grids, or through highly
decentralized micro-generation. Similarly, the different elements
of a policy to promote energy security – from domestic invest-
ment in demand reduction to controlling and protecting overseas
supplies – rest on assumptions about the geographical scale at
which energy systems should be governed.
This paper has two general aims: (1) to illustrate how the low-
carbon energy transition is fundamentally a geographical process
that involves reconﬁguring current spatial patterns of economic
and social activity; and (2) to provide a set of basic concepts with
which to map the geographies of a low-carbon energy system and
1 Energy ‘islands’ are also an important issue at the EU scale, where the Baltic
States are seen as a particular case of energy isolation that needs to be dealt with
by interconnection and cooperation.
2 These include the ESRC/EPSRC research cluster on Energy Security in a
MultiPolar World, the ESRC-EPSRC Interdisciplinary Cluster on Energy Systems,
Equity and Vulnerability, and the UK Energy Research Centre. The seminar series
‘Geographies of Energy Transition: security, climate, governance’ was funded by the
UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (RES-451-26-0692). The ﬁve seminars
in this series initiated a dialogue between human geography and the interdisci-
plinary ﬁeld of energy studies with the aim of (1) building research capacity
within human geography on issues of energy transition, energy security and
climate change, and the spatial organisation and governance of new energy
systems; (2) promoting inter-disciplinary collaboration; and (3) generating new
ways of thinking about energy transition as a geographically-constituted process.
This paper, written by the convenors of the seminar series, is informed by the
discussions that took place over the course of the ﬁve seminars. Many of the
contributions to the seminar series took the form of empirically-grounded
assessments of particular sectors, technologies or regions. The authors have
reﬂected on these contributions to develop in this paper a conceptual language
with which to describe and assess the geographical implications of a transition
towards low carbon energy.
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two aims are explored in the paper by reference to the geogra-
phical context of the UK. We adopt the UK as an illustrative case
because low-carbon transition has been an objective of national
government policy for nearly a decade (culminating in the
adoption of the world’s ﬁrst long-term, legally-binding targets
for carbon under the 2008 Climate Change Act); because many of
the companies, markets and infrastructures that comprise the
‘national’ energy system of the UK are integrated into interna-
tional economies in important ways; and because there is now
widespread recognition – not only within the interdisciplinary
ﬁeld of energy studies but also within the UK policy community –
that climate change, energy security, and the depletion of con-
ventional oil reserves are re-working established patterns and
scales of energy supply, distribution, and consumption (Anderson
et al., 2008; Haas et al., 2008; Stern, 2008). The UK’s Foresight
Programme on Sustainable Energy Management and the Built
Environment, for example, examined how the transition to
‘secure, sustainable’, low-carbon energy systems could be mana-
ged in part by re-examining the form, structure and spatial
organisation of urban landscapes (Beddington, 2008). Research
on the implementation of low-carbon electricity options high-
lights the different geographies and governance challenges asso-
ciated with an energy future based upon large, remote facilities
(like those for nuclear or offshore wind power) or highly dis-
tributed forms of household micro-generation (Watson, 2004).
And at the global scale, numerous studies demonstrate how
‘global energy challenges’ are constituted through their particular,
and often distinctive, geographies: the 2008 World Energy Out-
look, for example, traces a looming world ‘oil crunch’ to the rapid
growth of demand outside OECD countries, depletion in tradi-
tional basins serving OECD markets, and a new regionalisation in
oil and gas markets (International Energy Agency, 2008).
Notwithstanding this acknowledgement within energy studies
of some of the geographical dimensions of the new energy
paradigm, the way in which spatial processes shape energy
systems and inﬂuence their capacity for transformation has not
been a focal point for analyses. Indeed, it is the temporal concept
of ‘transition’ – rather than a geographical alternative – that is
most often mobilised for thinking about the changes involved in
developing low-carbon energy systems. As we examine below,
‘transition’ readily captures change over time for a given geogra-
phical unit (e.g., a country or a region) but frequently overlooks
changes in the spatial organisation of the energy system and
economic activity more widely. These geographical shifts are both
internal (within a particular region or country) and external in
that they involve relationships between one country/region and
others. The UK Government’s Low Carbon Transition Plan (LCTP),
for example, is clear in its proposals for transforming the power,
transport, housing, business and farming sectors of the economy
by 2020, but does not reﬂect on the implications of these changes
for the geographies of energy and economic activity within the UK
(or, indeed, their implications for energy infrastructure and
economic activity at regional or continental scales).
More recently, energy policy in the UK has begun to acknowl-
edge the spatial dimensions of energy transition. The Coalition
Government’s Renewables Road Map (2011), for example,
includes regional, map-based assessments of low-carbon deploy-
ment potential which identify some of the geographical options
for increasing the contribution of renewable energy technologies
to 15% of UK energy consumption by 2020 (see also Howard et al.,
2009 on land use implications of sustainable energy production in
the UK). The Road Map also highlights how harnessing renew-
ables has the potential to create new patterns – and geographical
scales – of economic integration, via its recognition of an
‘All Islands’ approach (Ireland, United Kingdom, Channel Islands,Isle of Man) to the generation and transmission of electricity from
low-carbon sources.1 The UK Government’s Department for
Energy and Climate Change 2050 Pathways analysis (and 2050
Calculator) – which for the most part adopt a simple national
scale of analysis – includes a mapping tool which encourages the
public to consider the land requirements and spatial trade-offs for
different energy supply technologies and the way different energy
technologies can be in competition for the same space (e.g.,
between rooftop solar PV and solar thermal). In general, as
policies like Electricity Market Reform have increasingly recog-
nised and quantiﬁed the investment challenges associated with a
low carbon transition, so there is increasing interest in where that
investment will materialise. The goal of a low carbon transition, in
other words, is slowly emerging as a question of which geogra-
phical futures will be created.
These efforts to map out the potential geographies of a low-
carbon economy are welcome but, in our view, are constrained by
a limited and somewhat rudimentary conceptualisation of the
spatial dimensions of energy transition. The ﬁeld of human
geography – for which space, place and scale are foundational
concepts – has developed conceptual tools with which to describe
and assess the spatiality of socio-economic and political activity
(the arrangement of social, economic and political life in geogra-
phical space). For example, economic geography developed the
notion of the ‘space economy’ to capture both the locational
pattern of economic activities and their inter-linkages at any one
point in time, and also the dynamic way in which the practical
activities of economy (trade, investment, regulation etc.) produce
new spatial conﬁgurations and relations (Isard, 1956, Harvey,
1982). The aim of this paper, then, is to unpack the spatiality of
the low carbon energy transition by providing a basic conceptual
language with which to describe and assess the geographical
implications of a transition towards low carbon energy (Massey,
2005). We draw upon the experience of a seminar series we co-
convened between 2009 and 2011, as well as our involvement in
various other energy research initiatives.22. Energy transition: From historical concept to geographical
framework
The concept of ‘energy transition’ is now widely used within
energy studies and has been incorporated into the national
energy policies of some countries. Although its implication of a
change in conditions is clear enough, there is no consensus on a
desired end state. In parts of the global South, energy transition
implies a signiﬁcant increase in the availability and affordability
3 Following Coe and Jones (2010).
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may also mean an increase in carbon intensity (around, for
example, increased personal mobility or the switch from house-
hold fuel wood to grid electricity) (Bradshaw, 2010). In the
‘transition economies’ of Central Europe and the former Soviet
Union energy transition is framed primarily as a ‘liberalisation’ of
the energy sector with key changes occurring in the structure of
ownership and the role of competition (Bouzarovski, 2009). In the
UK, energy transition is deﬁned within government policy as
movement towards a ‘secure, low carbon’ future with a target of
80% reduction in CO2 by 2050. Analyses of the lowest cost way
of achieving this goal lead to the conclusion that electricity is
likely to assume an increasing role: the UK policy goal is to
decarbonise the electricity sector ﬁrst (40% of electricity from low
carbon sources by 2020), and then use electricity more widely
to meet the target of 80% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2050
(Foxon et al., 2008).
Within energy studies, transition is employed analytically to
assess major historical shifts in energy systems at national and
global scales (Smil 2005, 2010; Podobnik, 2006, Fouquet and
Pearson, 1998). Research on historical energy transitions centres
on signiﬁcant shifts in the role of different primary fuels and
conversion technologies in the energy mix, such as the transition
from wood and water power to coal in the 19th century, or from
coal to oil in the twentieth. This work shows how historical
energy transitions have been associated with broad social change,
such as industrialisation, urbanisation and the growth of the
consumer society. A low-carbon energy transition is likely to be
as signiﬁcant – and its social, technological and geographical
implications as hard to imagine – as the shift from wood to coal,
or the electriﬁcation of urban and rural areas in the late 19th
century (Jiusto, 2009). Despite this, contemporary work on low-
carbon energy transition has paid only very limited attention to
questions of scale and space.
A guiding research framework (in Europe) has been the multi-
level perspectives approach to socio-technical transitions that
emphasises structural innovation in energy systems (Verbong and
Geels, 2007; Smith et al., 2010; Grin, 2012). This perspective
mobilises geographicalmetaphors – niche, regime and landscape –
to provide a contextual account of technological change and
understand system innovations over time. While this approach
has contributed a great deal to understanding of how transitions
can occur, its primary concerns are the unfolding of a temporal
process and the identiﬁcation of factors that cause some niches to
evolve, or be incorporated into regimes while others do not. These
concerns have tended to circumscribe any formal attention to
space, place and geographical scale within conventional transi-
tions theory.
Yet there are good reasons for thinking of transition in
geographical terms. First and foremost, energy systems are con-
stituted spatially: the components of the system are embedded in
particular settings and the networked nature of the system itself
produces geographies of connection, dependency and control.
This is most obvious with energy infrastructure – the classic
‘choke point’ and ‘bottleneck’ geographies associated with the
international shipment of crude oil or the management of
electricity distribution grids, for example (Emmerson and
Stevens, 2012) – but can also be extended to consider the
geopolitical and geo-economic dependencies associated with the
multinational ownership of oil, gas and electricity companies.
Furthermore, the ‘high energy society’ that is characteristic of
OECD economies (Nye, 1998) – one deﬁned by increasing energy
availability at progressively lower unit costs – has given rise to
distinctive spatial patterns of economic activity. At the world
scale, it has underpinned the increasing separation of produc-
tion and consumption since the 19th century (Chisholm, 1990).The globalisation of economic activity rests, in part, on falling
relative costs for energy in transportation (Dicken, 2011). This is
attributable to the increasing availability over time of progres-
sively higher quality energy sources (from coal to oil, or from
steam to electricity), increased economies of scale in the produc-
tion and transport of goods, and the ability to displace (socially,
temporally and geographically) many of the social and environ-
mental costs of increased energy abundance. And at regional
and urban scales, the price and availability of energy have
inﬂuenced patterns of urban development and building design.
It is well known, for example, ‘‘how the geographical pattern of
industrialisation in nineteenth century Europe closely coincided
with the geological distribution of coal beneath the ground’’ and
such inﬂuences are still visible in patterns of urbanisation in
contemporary Europe (Strange 1985:191). The strong correlation
between economic development (as measured by GDP per capita)
and national rates of energy consumption (particularly for elec-
tricity) powerfully illustrates how contemporary patterns of
economic activity rest on geographies of energy capture and
conversion and the ability to displace the environmental costs
of energy use over time and space.
Our interest lies in working out the geographical elements of
continuity and change associated with energy transition (Coe and
Jones, 2010: 10). Delivering energy services at affordable prices
but with fewer greenhouse gas emissions will require massive
investment to re-construct the geographies of producing, living,
and working with energy (International Energy Agency, 2008;
Mernier, 2007). Meeting the challenges of climate change and
energy security is, therefore, fundamentally a geographical pro-
ject: it not only requires societies to commit massive investment
to redesign infrastructure, buildings and equipment, but also to
make choices from a range of possible spatial solutions and scales
of governance.3. Unpacking space: Geographical components of transition
What do we mean by ‘geographies of energy transition’? By
geographies we mean at least two things:3 ﬁrst, the distribution of
different energy-related activities across a particular space – such
as the UK – and the underlying processes that give rise to these
patterns; and second, the geographical connections and interac-
tions between that space and other spaces (i.e.. the UK’s position
in a wider political economy of states, transnational ﬁrms,
international agreements, and non-governmental organisations).
This second point is particularly important: the energy system of
the UK is remarkably open to these non-domestic inﬂuences via a
combination of European and international commitments
(UNFCCC), European energy market liberalisation and the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme, the ownership of the ‘big six’ utilities
(as well as major oil companies) and, notwithstanding the UK’s
own coal, oil and gas resources, the high (and projected to rise)
penetration of imports in the UK’s primary energy mix. The UK
has gone from being a net energy exporter in 2000 to importing
28% of its hydrocarbon needs in 2010, with coal import depen-
dence reaching 51% and gas import dependence 38% (Department
of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), 2011a, 11).
The remainder of this section takes this process of unpacking
space a step further by outlining six geographical components of
transition. The examples provided are illustrative and our discus-
sion is not intended to be comprehensive. It is the sense of
contending geographical futures at the heart of low-carbon transi-
tion that we seek to capture here, rather than a deﬁnitive
Table 1
Potential changes in the location of key energy system components associated with a low-carbon energy transition.
Component of energy system Nature of locational change
Primary energy sources  Diversiﬁcation into non-conventional fuels (biofuels, oil sands and shale gas) may reduce import dependency and shorten
distances between location of energy capture/extraction and consumption; however, may also lead to expansion in the
geographical reach of energy systems in other instances (e.g., biofuels, conventional fossil, uranium).
Fossil fuel power plants  coal-ﬁred power plants may remain a key component of energy system, but logic of coalﬁeld location increasingly offset by costs
associated with transporting CO2 from point of capture to point of storage (under CCS);
 cost considerations move preferred location of new plants closer to CO2 storage sites (in the UK, this would mean the coast of the
North Sea)
Low-carbon electricity
generation
 installation of large, low-carbon electricity generating capacity (e.g., upland wind, offshore wind/wave, north African solar, coastal
nuclear) focused on resource locations remote from markets;
 overall geographical dispersal of electricity generating capacity, reﬂecting both lower energy densities of renewables and need to
address the intermittency of ﬂow resources like wind and solar
Electricity and gas transmission
systems
 increased electricity transmission capacity overall, particularly from north to south in scenarios with high levels of wind and/or
CCS, and greater connectivity of individual locations
 increased LNG in the short term and alternative long term futures, including rapid decline and substitution of natural gas by biogas
Consumers  increasingly dispersed, with energy demand increasingly marginal to value creation; increased awareness of carbon content
 small-scale generation opportunities blur distinctions between electricity producers/consumers in some settings
 conventional investments in supply augmentation and distribution supplemented with co-ordinated expenditures on energy
efﬁciency and demand reduction (mainly in urban settings)
4 There are also some locational continuities: in the speciﬁc context of UK
decarbonisation, for example, any new nuclear build will take place at existing
sites rather than at greenﬁeld locations.
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is to provide a conceptual framework for unpacking the spatial
elements of transition in order to think systematically about what
transition might mean for the spatial organisation of energy
systems—and for economic activity more generally.
3.1. Location (absolute and relative)
Thinking about the geographies of energy transition begins
with the basic spatial concept of location. ‘Location’ here is both
an absolute characteristic (latitude and longitude) and a relative
one, describing the ‘relational proximity’ of one element in the
system to another. While absolute location is ﬁxed and unchan-
ging, relative location can be highly dynamic: the application
of fossil energies to locomotion (railways, steamships) in the
mid-19th century, for example, dramatically changed the relational
proximity of cities served by these expanding networks, bringing
them ‘closer together’ while simultaneously increasing the rela-
tive distance between them and other places that were not served
by rail or steamship line. With the UK becoming a net importer of
fossil fuels over the past decade, so the country’s relative location
has changed. The recent upsurge of policy interest in ‘gas security’
in the UK, for example, reﬂects a repositioning of the country in the
global political economy of gas as a result of domestic offshore
depletion, perceived vulnerability at the ‘end’ of European pipelines
from Russia and Central Asia, and the construction of LNG import
terminals to increase the relative proximity of the UK market to
alternative gas supplies in North Africa, West Africa and the Middle
East. The transformation of relative location is also central to
contemporary debates over aviation and high-speed rail: advocates
celebrate their capacity for decreasing travel time and increas-
ing the frequency and intensity of interactions between places,
while critics point to energy consumption (and carbon emissions)
associated with higher speeds.
Brief examples like these serve to indicate how the current,
carbon-intensive energy system (fossil fuel extraction, electricity
generation, waste disposal) has a particular spatiality—that is, its
interlinked elements occupy locations in space. The ‘logic’ of these
contemporary locations is related to historical considerations and,
in large part, they reﬂect an energy system designed to deliver
abundant, reliable supplies at low cost to consumers withoutregard for carbon constraints. The decarbonisation agenda, com-
bined with signiﬁcant shifts in the structure of the domestic
economy associated with de-industrialisation and the rise of the
consumer-society, has thrown many of these locational consid-
erations into question. Within economic production there has
been a relative shift from industry to services: industrial output
has grown only 30% in the UK over the last 40 years, while the
economy as a whole has grown by 150%. The UK’s energy ratio
(the relationship between the growth of GDP and the growth of
energy consumption has declined 2% per year on average since
1970 (DECC, 2011b, 164).
Less noticed, but equally important, energy use has shifted
from being predominantly associated with economic production
to consumption: approximately 50% of UK energy use is now in
homes and personal transport (largely private cars). Much energy
use in the service sector has a similar character: it is highly
distributed (individually and at small scale), and marginal to the
process of production. While absolute growth in demand in these
sectors has now ended in the UK, most energy futures foresee a
continuing relative shift from large scale centralised consumption
to a distributed energy consuming future.
We can also consider the location of other elements of the
energy system beyond demand. Implementation of a low-carbon
energy transition, such as outlined in the UK Government’s Low
Carbon Transition Plan (2009), will involve several signiﬁcant
shifts in the location of key components of the contemporary
energy system (Table 1). The decarbonisation of the power sector,
for example, may be associated with shifts in the nature and
location of primary energy sources as well as the location of new
build fossil fuel power plants.4 Similarly, programmes like the
Green Deal imply a shift downstream in the locus of investment
in the energy system towards improving consumption efﬁciencies
in the housing and commercial sectors.
Policies designed to achieve a low-carbon energy transition will
also have an impact on the spatial organisation of local, regional and
global economies. The globalisation of manufacturing activity since
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energy sources and the consequent falling cost of transportation
(Dicken, 2011). The current global distribution of economic activity
– the international spatial division of labour – is a function of an
historically-speciﬁc relationship between energy, environment and
economic production. The remarkable growth of world trade since
1950 – more than four times faster than world economic output –
occurred under conditions where the energy costs of production and
transportation were low (relative to total costs) for many goods and
where the environmental effects of industrial capitalism have been
largely external to the decision-making of ﬁrms and states. The
divergent trends in greenhouse gas emissions between developed
countries (stable) and developing economies (increasing) is due in
no small part to international trade ﬂows arising out of global shifts
in manufacturing (Peters et al., 2011). The effect has been most
marked in the last decade with the rise of manufacturing in China
effectively resulting in relocation of a signiﬁcant fraction of devel-
oped world industrial energy demand to a region with a higher
carbon intensity of production.
Any signiﬁcant increase in the cost of energy and/or carbon
will reassert the historic ‘friction of distance,’ with signiﬁcant
implications for the geographical distribution of economic activ-
ity (Rubin 2009). Together the ‘end of cheap oil’ and the emer-
gence of carbon pricing have the potential to re-draw the map of
economic activity in some interesting ways—just as previous
revolutions in the cost and availability of energy to society
produced distinctive geographical forms. There is already some
evidence that a process of ‘deglobalisation’ may be underway in
parts of the food sector, in response to rising fuel prices and a
range of consumer concerns that include ‘food miles’ and a desire
to support ‘local’ production (Bailey and Wilson, 2009; North,
2010). Our broader point here is the need to understand how the
locational decisions that underpin contemporary patterns of
international trade – and, more generally, the global map of
economic activity – are premised on abundant and low-cost
fossil fuels.
3.2. Landscape
Whereas location refers to a point in absolute or relative space,
‘landscape’ describes the assemblage of natural and cultural
features across a broad space and the history of their production
and interaction. We use the term ‘energy landscape’ in the same
way as implied by an ‘economic’ or an ‘urban’ landscape: that is,
to describe the constellation of activities and socio-technical
linkages associated with energy capture, conversion, distribution
and consumption. For geographers, material landscapes – from oil
ﬁelds, to wind farms, to urban settlements – are the product of
social processes and the outcomes of conﬂict and negotiation
among different social groups. The transition towards a low-
carbon economy will require the re-appraisal of the form, func-
tion and value of some contemporary and familiar landscapes. On
the one hand, landscapes dedicated to fossil fuel extraction or
methane-producing livestock production, or premised on the
combustion of liquid fuels, are now scrutinised by policy makers
for ways in which their carbon-intensive character might be
foreclosed, mitigated or offset. On the other, landscape forms
that sequester carbon or which provide opportunities for the
generation of ‘green power’ gain a new source of potential value
and are targeted for commercial development. These include both
remote rural landscapes, such as uplands (for wind) and narrow
sea passages (for tidal stream), and urban environments (for
building mounted photovoltaics and energy from waste). The
twin goals of decarbonisation and energy security mean that
‘‘energy will again become a major driver in land cover change’’
(Howard et al., 2009: S284). In this way low-carbon transitionpolicies are productive of new energy landscapes, while ‘carbon
control’ has become a critical metric of political and economic
governance at urban, regional and international scales (While
et al., 2010: 77; Bridge, 2011).
Because potential low-carbon resources are already embedded
in existing geographical settings, harnessing them to the objec-
tives of low-carbon energy transition involves conversion or
modiﬁcation of current practices and systems of valuation. Exist-
ing social attachments sometimes present strikingly different
systems of value compared to energy prices or tons of CO2
foregone—for example, tidal zones valued for their contribution
to ecological and biodiversity objectives. Some of the ﬁercest
contemporary struggles around energy transition centre on the
development of lower-carbon energy technologies such as wind,
tidal and hydro, as well as the creation of new reservoirs and
depositories (for carbon and nuclear waste) to better manage the
downstream impacts of conventional fuels. For many people,
then, ‘low carbon energy transition’ is experienced as the trans-
formation of landscape—i.e., the extension of industrial and
extractive components of the energy system into places and com-
munities that previously were unaffected. It is for this reason that
‘‘landscape has become a key arena in the debate on energy policy’’
(Nadai and Van der Horst, 2010: 143; see also Pasqualetti, 2011).
Landscape not only refers to the material features of a
particular setting, but also implies the cultural evaluations and
emotional attachments that people load onto these material
forms. The geographical notion of ‘topophilia’ (love of place) can
be helpful here, as it describes the attachments to place that
people form with particular material forms and, in western
societies, the dominance of the visual aesthetic (the optic of
‘beauty’) as a way of appreciating landscape (Tuan, 1974; Nadai
and Van der Horst, 2010). Many of these cultural constructs are
built into planning regulations and into law – via land use
designations such as Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty and
rules on visual intrusion, for example – in ways that constrain the
deployment of low-carbon technologies in some settings while
simultaneously enabling them in others (which lack such desig-
nation). Understanding place attachment and the emotional
responses that people can have to energy landscapes provides a
more productive approach than simplistic assertions of NIMBY-
ISM for analysing conﬂicts over energy landscapes (Devine-
Wright 2005, 2011).
Popular debate may have been excessively occupied with a
narrow range of siting controversies associated with wind tur-
bines and high voltage electricity transmission pylons, yet the
potential landscape transformations associated with a low-carbon
transition extend far more widely. They include, for example, the
adoption of annual and short-rotation energy crops in agriculture
(alongside more traditional herbaceous crops) in response to
policy initiatives like the EU Biofuels Directive and the UK’s
Renewables Obligation. The role that new fuel crops – like
Miscanthus, Willow or Poplar – can play in multifunctional
agricultural landscapes is currently unclear, although concern
has been raised at the potential for large-scale land conversion
and energy commodity production at the expense of other, ‘post-
productivist’ goals like watershed protection and biodiversity
conservation (Upham et al., 2011). The growing OECD-demand
for biomass energy means that policy objectives in these coun-
tries are driving land transformations beyond their borders, in
countries of the global South where net primary productivity is
high and where political conditions are conducive to investment
(McQueen and Korhaliller, 2011). In these countries, new indus-
trial demands for exported biomass (e.g., as biomass pellets for
co-ﬁring in electricity production) intersect with long-established
uses of fuelwood (and other forms of biomass) for heating and
cooking. This can create opportunities for economic development,
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against) the grain of existing inequalities. By drawing attention
to the livelihood strategies associated with particular conﬁgura-
tions of plants and people, ‘landscape’ provides a way to examine
the social implications of the new energy landscapes associated
with low carbon transition.
A low-carbon energy transition has signiﬁcant implications for
landscape at the urban scale too. Increased attention to energy
efﬁciency and carbon management at the urban scale mean that
long-standing assumptions about city spatial form, the density
of settlement, building design and choice of materials are being
re-considered (Lovell, 2007; Bulkeley et al., 2011; Hodson and
Marvin, forthcoming). At the level of everyday experience, one of
the most visible components of a low-carbon, urban landscape
will be changes in the space allocated to different transport
systems—speciﬁcally, a reduction in the dominance of the car
within the urban landscape and the growth of mass transport and
other non-car alternatives (including cycle lanes and pedestria-
nisation). In general then, the concept of ‘landscape’ is useful for
understanding energy transition because it draws attention to the
interaction of natural, technical and cultural phenomena in a
geographical setting, and how these particular assemblages vary
over space and time. This heterogeneity of landscape is signiﬁcant
for policy: it is both a source of novelty and experimentation
(different places can do things differently) and a cause of
uncertainty in outcomes (existing conditions refract standard
policies into a range of responses) (see Nadai and Van der
Horst, 2010). While many of the manufactured landscapes of
fossil fuel capitalism have become ‘normalised’ over time (the
coal mine and factory-city, the gas station and suburban strip-
mall), many of the potential landscapes associated with a low-
carbon transition are highly contested, raising questions about
which landscapes should be made, and who landscapes are for. In
this way, a rather prosaic concept – landscape – can be a powerful
tool for thinking through some of the most challenging issues
associated with low-carbon energy transition.
3.3. Territoriality
How social and political power are organised and exercised
over space is described by human geographers as ‘territoriality’
(Brenner et al., 2003). The concept applies to the geographical
strategies of partition and integration employed by economic and
political actors (states, ﬁrms) in the exercise of authority and/or
commercial power. All infrastructure systems for energy capture,
transmission and distribution are spatially constituted, but they
have been territorialized in different ways over time. In the
electricity sector, for example, a series of isolated ‘islands of
power’ have been replaced over time by integrated national and
continental scale grid systems (Platt, 1991, Nye, 1998). Similar
trends have been observed in gas grids with a move from city-
scale coal gas production to national, and now continental scale,
grids. While these might simply be described as scaling up or
integration, a focus on the way energy systems are territorialized
draws attention to the different scales and arenas of political
action that govern energy systems because of the way they are
spatially constituted (Hughes, 1993).
Historically, the re-territorialisation of electricity at the scale
of the nation – the replacement of localised municipal systems
with a national grid – has been a major political project, as well as
an economic one. This is not simply to recognise that such
transformational projects required political will: rather, that the
re-scaling of energy infrastructure and the diffusion of particular
technologies have also been integral to political projects in their
broadest sense, such as the modernisation of the nation and the
making of the modern citizen. Accounts of the territorialexpansion of hydropower (White, 1996; Byrne and Toly, 2006),
nuclear (Hecht, 1998; Jasanoff and Kim, 2009), and hydrocarbon
energy sources (Bouzarovski and Bassin, 2011) illustrate how the
natural resources and technologies of energy systems can inﬂu-
ence the rise of particular group afﬁliations at the level of nation
states. A critical point here is that the spatial diffusion of energy
technologies is culturally contingent: how new energy technolo-
gies spread across space often depends on how these technologies
(and the natural resources upon which they are deployed) are
embedded in (national) systems of signiﬁcation and cultural
routines. This is signiﬁcant for policy because the deployment
and geographical diffusion of new and more efﬁcient technologies
– from electricity generation based on renewables, to electric cars
and household smart meters – has a central role in most policy
accounts of low-carbon energy transition.
Territoriality is particularly useful for thinking through the
contemporary challenges and opportunities of low-carbon transi-
tion in the UK because of its focus on the interaction of political
power and bounded space, and because the territorialisation of
the UK energy system is an unsettled project that is on-going and
contested. The UK’s energy system is being re-territorialised in
the context of EU policies on the liberalisation of energy markets
and the EU’s desire to implement a European energy strategy: in
simple terms, energy landscapes in the UK increasingly depend on
decisions made outside the UK—in Brussels, or in the head-
quarters of international energy companies. At the same time,
there is an increasing recognition of the signiﬁcant role that cities
and urban infrastructural networks play in energy consumption
and the emission of greenhouse gases and that, as a consequence,
cities are potentially important sites for political action around
energy transition (Bulkeley et al., 2011; Hodson and Marvin,
forthcoming, While et al., 2010). Several initiatives – both part
of formal government policy and outside it (e.g., Transition
Towns) – seek strategically to territorialize low-carbon transition
at the urban scale. And the C40 Cities Group seeks to circumvent
the gridlock in the inter-governmental climate process by a global
alliance of city initiatives. Other territorialisations of low-carbon
energy – such as the ambition articulated by some political
leaders in Scotland to be the ‘‘Saudi Arabia of renewables’’
– speak directly to the way energy projects can do political work
(in this case as part of a broader strategy of political indepen-
dence). More generally, the concept of competing or alternative
territorialisations is helpful for understanding Europe as a con-
tested ‘geo-energy space’, in which a series of territorial legacies
(including the ‘imperial’ energy infrastructures of the FSU in eastern
Europe, and a diverse set of national energy systems in western
Europe), the liberalisation agenda of the Energy Charter and an
emergent regional energy strategy (exempliﬁed by the EU-Russia
Energy Dialogue, for example) are all in contention (Man˜e-Estrada,
2006; Correlje´ and Linde, 2006; Bouzarovski, 2009).
Territoriality is also valuable for thinking about the way in
which energy production networks are organised geographically
in order to generate and capture value. The territoriality of energy
infrastructure networks can be assessed in terms of their con-
tiguity (dispersion/density) and connectivity (Hess, 2004). Histor-
ical assessments of large infrastructural systems draw a
distinction between the ‘city’ and the ‘network’ as two contrasting
spatial forms (Coutard, 1999): while both connectivity and con-
tiguity are high in the former, the latter have high connectivity
but low contiguity (Table 2). However, to these we can add a third
dimension of territoriality: that of centralisation, which describes
the degree to which critical capacity and supply decisions are
centralised and co-ordinated by a single body. The degree to
which power and authority over a network are centralised or
devolved can be signiﬁcant for its capacity to contribute to the
goals of a low carbon transition. In the case of the UK’s ‘big six’
Table 2
Infrastructural networks for energy.
Illustrative spatial form Contiguity Connectivity Centralisation of capacity and supply decisions
District heating system High (i.e., a dense
geographical form)
High (many points of
connection)
High/Low (centralised within each district heating facility;
although fragmented at national scale)
National electricity grid (prior to
unbundling)
Low (i.e., a dispersed
geographical form) High High
Continental gas pipeline Low Low (few points of
connection)
High
National electricity grid (with multiple
autonomous suppliers) Low High Low
Off-grid ‘autarkic’ domestic electricity
generation High Low
High/Low (centralised within each building; although very
fragmented at national scale)
G. Bridge et al. / Energy Policy 53 (2013) 331–340 337energy companies, for example, analysis suggests the centralised
structure of these organisations constrains their ability to deliver
both decentralised renewable investment (Mitchell, 2007) and
the demand-side activity that is a key piece of UK policy on
improving the efﬁciency of gas and electricity consumption in
households (Eyre, 2010), because the customer-facing compo-
nents of these large, international ﬁrms are, in fact, downstream
appendages of integrated energy companies where the major
proﬁt centres are upstream.
The simple typology of Table 2 highlights some of the con-
tending spatial forms that are at work in the evolution of a low
carbon energy system. A strategy that targets ﬂow resources like
wind or solar for the generation of electricity requires a dispersed
strategy of generation, in order to manage the relatively low
power densities and intermittency associated with these
resources (diurnal and seasonal variation in insolation rates or
the reliability of wind). These dispersed sites can be operated
‘off-grid’ (or as part of regionally-contained grid systems) or they
can be networked nationally. The question of centralisation,
however, is independent of the infrastructural conﬁguration: a
series of dispersed, off-grid sites may be owned and managed by
a single company, while a highly-networked model may be
comprised of independent suppliers. Coutard and Rutherford
(2010) highlight a number of alternative models associated with
low-carbon transition that challenge the modern large-scale
network, including off-grid development, local loop-closing
systems, strategies for the preservation of unequipped spaces,
and support for feed-in to networks by independent suppliers.
Addressing the challenge of universal access to modern energy
services, for example, will involve a combination of grid and off-
grid solutions (World Bank, 2010).
3.4. Spatial differentiation and uneven development
A geographical perspective on energy transition is one attuned
to spatial variation and, more particularly, the production of
geographical differences. Taken together, the locations, land-
scapes and territorialisations associated with a low-carbon energy
transition will generate new patterns of uneven development.
Understanding this variation and difference is important. For
geographers, spatial differentiation is understood not as a static
mosaic of inherent difference, but as a process of simultaneous
equalisation and differentiation—the ‘‘ongoing production of
differences between places’’ (Crang, 1996).
It is clear that some of the processes associated with energy
transition will promote spatial convergence: the normalisation of
appliance standards for energy efﬁciency, for example, means
that geographical variation in the energy efﬁciency of particular
appliances will be reduced over time and, in some instances,
eliminated. Growing energy trade, technological diffusion, and
standardisation of consumption norms are also expected to drivea convergence in the energy intensity of GDP over time (BP, 2012,
19). Other aspects of energy transition, however, will enhance the
degree of difference between places: to the extent that building
regulations are increasingly attuned to local climatic conditions,
for example, building codes are likely to favour a return to
vernacular forms of architecture which feature passive heating
and cooling solutions. Similarly, because the capacity to take up
different renewable energy technologies is closely linked to
geographical conditions – as well as being mediated by prevailing
conceptions of landscape quality – the regional uptake of renew-
ables is likely to exhibit wide spatial variation: Cowell (2010)
illustrates the complex and uneven pattern of wind farm devel-
opment within Wales, for example. However, much contempor-
ary discussion of energy transition is either aspatial or based on
implicit assumptions about spatial convergence, with compara-
tively little attention to how policy proposals for the low-carbon
economy will inﬂuence current patterns of uneven development.
The process of spatial differentiation – or the ‘production of
geographical difference’ – is not limited to energy systems
themselves, but extends to their implications for patterns of
economic growth and development. The innovations associated
with low carbon transition are, like many other technologies,
found in geographically-deﬁned clusters. There are plenty of
examples of places around the world promoting themselves as
a hub for low-carbon development, where regional economic
fortunes are hitched to becoming an important global locus of
innovation for low carbon energy, or as an export platform for
low-carbon power (such as the Desertec initiative to use the
abundant solar resource in North Africa to supply Europe via an
extended international electricity grid, or proposals for biomass
exports from the tropics). Spatial differentiation consequent to a
low-carbon transition also extends to ﬁnancial ﬂows associated
with carbon services (such as carbon offsetting via the Clean
Development Mechanism or payments under REDD) and to the
implications of transition for economies predicated on the pro-
duction or conversion of fossil fuels. The broader point here is the
potential of a low carbon transition to re-work established
patterns of ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ at multiple scales, and the need
to conceptualise low carbon transition as a simultaneous process of
geographical equalization and differentiation that has the potential
to produce new patterns of uneven development. And it is, of course,
precisely because of this potential to create new geographies of
winners and losers that low-carbon transition faces opposition from
those with a vested interest in the status quo.
3.5. Scaling
Scale here refers to the material size and areal extent of
phenomena. It describes the different geographical forms in
which different energy technologies can be deployed—from
micro-scale applications of wind turbines and solar PV at the
5 In many countries in the global South, by contrast, a lack of state capacity
and limited private investment mean that localised solutions are often the only
ones available. The challenge in these settings is frequently one of scaling up.
G. Bridge et al. / Energy Policy 53 (2013) 331–340338household scale to macro-scale deployments across entire land-
scapes, for example. It can also describe the varying geographical
reach of different political structures – such as local, regional and
national government; and forms of economic organisation –
differentiating, for example, a businesses operating in only one
locality from a transnational corporation. Because the scale at
which energy systems are organised and governed is not pre-
ordained and arises instead as a product of economic and political
decisions, it useful to adopt the verb (scaling) rather the noun.
Scaling highlights not only the emergent character of geographical
scale in the context of energy systems; it also emphasises the
range of choices that exist in how low carbon energy systems
might be scaled.
The question of scale is particularly signiﬁcant for renewable
energy technologies (such as biomass, solar PV, solar heat and
wind) which, more than other energy technologies, can be
deployed across a very wide range of material sizes—what
Walker and Cass (2007) term the ‘hypersizeability’ of renewable
energy hardware. The signiﬁcant point is that ‘‘each of these
hardwares, when implemented at different sizes, has different
relational qualities of physical presence, connection to other
physical infrastructure (buildings in particular), degrees of mobi-
lity and potential for environmental impact and disturbance’’
(Walker and Cass, 2007: 460). The social meaning of renewable
energy technologies, therefore, varies considerably depending on
the geographical scale of their deployment as well as the manner
or mode in which they are deployed (public utility, private
supplier, community etc). While European and UK energy policies
establish clear targets for renewables, they have very little to say
on the scalar conﬁguration of their deployment. There are, however,
‘‘profound social and geographical implications embedded within
emerging patterns of renewable energy utilisation’’ that a focus on
scaling is beginning to tease out (Walker and Cass, 2007: 458).
This plays out in policy decisions about Feed-in tariffs differentiated
by project size, which have implications for the cost effectiveness of
different scales, e.g., distributed versus centralised solar PV, and
therefore for different landscapes.
Assumptions about scale pervade energy policy. While these
often go unchallenged, they nonetheless can have signiﬁcant
consequences. Energy policy as conceived by most public policy
makers in economies like the UK (as opposed to the wider set of
activities and actors that constitute energy governance), is made
at the nexus of central Government and the oligopolies that
dominate national energy supply —the international oil industry
and (largely trans-national) electricity supply companies. This has
two implications. The ﬁrst is that the decentralised parts of the
energy system – distributed supply, end use technology and the
determinants of demand itself – are systematically marginalised
in policy making. Although, self-evidently, (largely distributed)
demand is quantitatively as important as (largely centralised)
supply, the policy levers and actors immediately available to
national policy makers operate predominantly at the national
scale. There is therefore a tendency to treat decentralised actors
as remote, unpredictable or even capricious, especially when they
‘fail’ to behave in accordance with the preferred models of
national decision-makers. Hence the preference for ‘reliable’,
centralised, supply side solutions. Alternative futures, with more
reliance on energy demand reduction require smaller scale energy
systems (Eyre et al., 2010).
The second implication is that even policy objectives relating
to distributed supply, energy efﬁciency and energy demand have
increasingly been delivered through obligations on the dominant
supply companies, notably the Renewables Obligation and the
Carbon Emissions Reduction Commitment. This choice is because
these companies are key actors in the recognised system, rather
than necessarily the most effective actors to deliver decentralisedactivity. Indeed, the evidence would tend to indicate that trans-
national energy companies are very unlikely to be the best at, for
example, securing support from local communities for wind farms
(Walker et al., 2007) or undertaking detailed building refurbish-
ment (Killip, 2011). The centralisation of policy arguably therefore
results in ineffective policy when the object of ‘delivery’ is widely
distributed.
The alternative, devolving energy policy more widely, would
be a major change for economies like the UK.5 Local stakeholders,
notably local government, have been marginalised from energy
governance since the post-war nationalisation of utilities. They
have little capacity to engage effectively in energy policy debates,
no seat at the tables where energy policy is made and often little
involvement with programme delivery. There has been a rise in
interest in ‘‘carbon’’ in some of the more progressive local
authorities and some high proﬁle initiatives involving major cities
(While et al., 2010). However, there is no evidence that these have
had any signiﬁcant impact. Centralised governance largely repre-
sents a hangover from a period when distributed issues were
perceived as less central to energy policy challenges. However,
neither recent nor planned changes offer much prospect of
change. Although the reform of energy markets in the 1990s
(privatisation, liberalisation and unbundling) might seem to have
been a step in that direction through breaking the dominant role
of the state, in practice the system that has developed is different
largely in the balance of public and private power, but is still
highly centralised.
Energy is typically scaled as a national issue because no
government wants to risk the domestic political consequences
of a failure in supply: in countries like the UK, where reliable
energy services have become the norm, ‘keeping the lights on’ is a
powerful political imperative (Stevens, 2010). Current policy
initiatives around ‘energy security’ exemplify this default to the
national scale and the privileging of some socio-technical conﬁg-
urations and material sites over others. Scaled differently, how-
ever, it is possible to see how problems such as energy poverty or
domestic warmth deprivation are also issues of energy security,
as both endanger human security at the level of the household
(Bouzarovski et al., 2012). As an analytical lens, scaling can
illuminate signiﬁcant questions about who is affected, who has
the capacity for action, and where the boundaries of responsi-
bility lie. It can, therefore, be extremely useful for highlighting
capability gaps within policy (such as where responsibility exists
without capacity, or where an affected group has limited capacity
for action) and for opening up alternatives that illuminate the
scalar assumptions upon which current initiatives rest.3.6. Spatial embeddedness and path dependency
The ﬁnal concept we introduce here is that of spatial embedd-
edness (and path dependency) as obstacles to a low-carbon
transition. In doing so, we draw inspiration from multi-level
transition theory’s comparison of niche and incumbent energy
systems. However, we take this a step further to recognise how
‘niche’ and ‘incumbency’ are an expression of the different
degrees to which energy systems are geographically embedded.
By embeddedness we mean both the sunk costs of capital
investment (represented by the built environment and the infra-
structures of energy capture, conversion and consumption), and
the place-based cultures of consumption that surround certain
energy technologies (expressed, for example, in expectations and
G. Bridge et al. / Energy Policy 53 (2013) 331–340 339norms about the cost and reliability of supply, or the social
practices associated with energy consumption). Spatial embedd-
edness, then, encompasses the economic, material and cultural
aspects of energy systems. This can be seen with particular clarity
in the context of automobility, and the difﬁculty of persuading
people to give up their car in favour of other forms of mobility
(Paterson, 2007). The degree to which fossil fuel consumption is
‘built into’ the urban landscape (in the morphology of cities, the
allocation of space to the car and the systematic under-provision
of alternatives, and via norms of car ownership) demonstrates
wide geographical variation. Spatial lock-in can be a major
challenge to those seeking to achieve a low carbon transition
via encouraging consumer-drivers to switch transport modes.
In other settings, however – such as parts of the developing
world – historically limited energy service provision means
fossil fuels have not become embedded in the same way. Limited
lock-in around fossil fuels can create opportunities for the rapid
uptake of renewables. Places where state-led development has
conspicuously failed to extend centralised electricity services via
comprehensive rural electriﬁcation, for example, can provide
opportunities for the deployment of small-scale photovoltaics
(in much the same way that lack of ﬁxed line telephone service
has created opportunities for rapid penetration of mobiles)
(Ulsrud et al., 2011).
What is clear is that the normative vision of a ‘low carbon
transition’ that guides policy in many OECD countries – where
transition involves challenging an incumbent high-carbon system
– can be achieved in a number of quite different ways. While a
greater role for highly distributed actors is widely discussed (as
set out above), this is neither inevitable nor the only form of low
carbon transition. Other discourses focus on using very large
sources of alternative energy to replace the existing dominant
fossil fuel sources. There is, of course, a legitimate normative
debate about the extent to which such a solution is ‘‘better’’ or
‘‘worse’’ than distributed alternatives. We do not seek to address
that here. We simply note that the governance implications of
highly distributed and centralised systems are quite different,
with a much bigger role for effective international agreements
and lower reliance on sub-national actors in the case of the latter.
And whilst it is quite possible to design a technical system with
aspects of both approaches, the governance implications of the
two systems are so different that such a ‘’mix and match’
approach may not be possible. An early move in either direction
may ‘lock out’ the other option, not because it is innately less
desirable, but rather because the institutional arrangements may
make the alternative inoperable.4. Conclusion: Space and the low-carbon economy
Convergent research interests within energy studies and
human geography provide an opportunity to critically examine
the spatiality of energy transition. We have outlined the nature of
this shared interest and how it illuminates issues of relevance to
contemporary energy and climate policy. Our call is for future
research to capitalise on this convergence by paying greater
attention to the geographies of a low-carbon energy transition.
Recasting transition as geographical process changes the ques-
tions that become important for researchers to ask. Viewed
through the lens of time, key questions about transition include
the different temporalities of technological and policy innovation,
the rates at which particular energy technologies may be main-
streamed, or the evolution of consumption behaviour. By contrast,
a geographical perspective on transition foregrounds questions
about spatial difference (and the co-existence of multiple transition
pathways and possibilities); relations of position and connection(as illustrated, for example, by the simultaneous processes of
integration and fragmentation associated with new energy infra-
structure); and spatial conﬁguration and scales of organisation (for
example, the durability of national energy systems). Understand-
ing the geographies of a low carbon energy transition, then, is
about more than mapping the consequences of policy, or under-
standing the implications of different policy options for particular
places (important as these are). Instead, we argue, a goal for
future research should be to understand how energy transitions
are spatially-constituted.
Understanding transition as a geographically-constituted pro-
cess – rather than as a process that affects places – has a number
of signiﬁcant implications for policy. First, spatial difference and
the fundamentally uneven nature of spatial interactions are both
potentially disruptive to policy because they complicate many its
assumptions: understanding the way these interactions and
interrelations can enable or frustrate policy goals is therefore of
practical value. Second, space is a necessary condition for the
possibility of multiple, co-existing energy pathways and, there-
fore, an important source of variety and experimentation: there
are signiﬁcant opportunities, therefore, for understanding the
relationship between different trajectories of energy transition
and the geographical conditions from which they emerge
(Massey, 2005). Third, it highlights how implementing a low-
carbon economy will be a simultaneously creative and destructive
process that signiﬁcantly changes how different places are related
to each other, economically, politically and even culturally, and at
a range of different scales.
Our purpose in this paper has been to introduce a basic
conceptual language for unpacking the ‘spatial’ components of
energy transition. In focussing on how transition is geographically
constituted we are neither denying the importance of other
dimensions nor insisting on the primacy of the spatial. Rather
our more modest goal has been to provide a conceptual language
for systematically working through the spatialities of energy
transition. The six components we have identiﬁed are entry
points rather than end points: they provide a basic conceptual
tool kit with which to develop richer understandings of space
and spatial change than are characteristic of current policy
approaches to energy transition. Our examples indicate how the
geographies of the low-carbon economy are not yet determined
and that a range of divergent – and contending – potential
geographical futures are in play. More attention to the spatialities
of a low-carbon economy can help us better understand what
living in a low-carbon economy will be like. They also provide a
way to help evaluate the choices and pathways available.Acknowledgements
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